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NOTES
THE DEMISE OF THE LATENT BRAKE
DEFECT DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA
The plaintiff brought a negligence suit against both the non-
owner driver and the owner of an automobile that struck the plain-
tiff's car from the rear. The jury returned a verdict for the two
defendants, apparently' finding that the defendants' conduct was not
negligent because of a latent defect in the braking system of the
car. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed,' stating that in the future, cases
involving brake defects will be dealt with under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2317,1 which makes persons responsible for damages
caused by things in their custody. Application of this article, and the
jurisprudence construing it,' makes the custodian and owner of an
automobile liable for injuries caused by the defective car, absent a
showing of victim fault, third-party fault, or an irresistible force.
Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978).
Louisiana, as well as most other states, has long recognized the
latent brake defect doctrine as a valid defense to an allegation of a
defendant's negligence.5 This doctrine stands for the proposition
that the owner of a car is not liable for damages resulting from a
collision if "such accident is occasioned solely by latent defects in
materials ... of the automobile which the usual and well recognized
tests afforded by science and art for the purpose fail to detect."'
1. The plaintiff alleged negligence in the trial court, and the defendants coun-
tered with a latent brake defect defense. It must be assumed that the defense was the
factor which determined the jury's verdict.
2. The supreme court was not concerned only with the subject of latent brake
defects. The primary point of interest under scrutiny in the case was the standard of
appellate review of facts. The court of appeal chose not to disturb the trial jury's ver-
dict, saying it found no manifest error. The supreme court held that in order to deter-
mine if manifest error was present, an appellate court is under a duty to scrutinize all
the evidence to determine whether a verdict is manifestly erroneous. The appellate
court had refused to overturn the jury verdict, apparently because there was some
evidence in the record that supported the jury finding. The supreme court found the
verdict clearly wrong, and thus reversed. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Civil Procedure, 40 LA. L. REV. 761 (1980). This case-
note shall not discuss this holding.
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2317 provides in pertinent part: "We are responsible, not
only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act
of persons for which we are answerable, or for the things which we have in our
custody."
4. See, e.g., Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976); Note, The "Discovery" of
Article 2317, 37 LA. L. REV. 234 (1976).
5. Hassell v. Colletti, 12 So. 2d 31 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943), is the first appear-
ance of the latent brake defect doctrine in the jurisprudence of this state.
6. 1 BLASHFIELD'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 672 (perm.
ed. 1935). Black's Law Dictionary defines a latent defect as "[o]ne which could not be
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Thus, it can be seen that the defense is simply an application of the
traditional tort principle of no liability without fault 7-if the defense
is valid, the defendant is not at fault. In Louisiana, the doctrine was
employed by defendants to refute an allegation of negligence, which,
if proved, would establish fault under the Louisiana Civil Code arti-
cles dealing with delictual responsibility! The defense is employed
similarly in some other jurisdictions as a simple denial of negligence.'
Despite the presence of the latent brake defect doctrine as a
defense in Louisiana," it was many years before a latent brake
discovered by reasonable and careful inspection; one not apparent on [the] face of
goods, product, document, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (5th ed. 1979). The latent
defect doctrine is not limited solely to brake cases. See, e.g., Ross v. Tynes, 14 So. 2d
80 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943) (where a wheel detached, and the defense was rejected);
Westlund v. Iverson, 154 Minn. 52, 191 N.W. 253 (1922) (where a wheel detached, and
the defense was successful). Nor is the defense limited only to automobile cases. See,
e.g., Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943) (boats); Schon v. James, 28 So. 2d 531 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1946) (water heater); Sack v. Ralston, 220 Pa. 216, 69 A. 671 (1908)
(elevators).
7. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 492 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser states that at the close
of the nineteenth century, a tendency towards "the recognition of 'fault' . . . [existed]
[.. land that] [t]his tendency was so marked that efforts were made by noted writers
to construct a consistent theory of tort law upon the basic principle that there should
be no liability without fault." Id.
Louisiana has based its tort law on this "basic principle" as it is set forth in article
2315. See note 8, infra. A statement of the principle may be seen in Delisle v. Bour-
riague, 105 La. 84, 29 So. 731 (1901), wherein the court declared that "there is no
responsibility when there is no fault ...." Id. at 87, 29 So. at 734.
8. Civil Code articles 2315-22 comprise the rules of delictual responsibility in
Louisiana. Article 2315 states in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." "Fault" is defined in
article 2316, which states, in part: "Every person is responsible for the damage he
occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of
skill." Thus negligence came to be viewed as the exclusive definition of fault in Loui-
siana. See, e.g., Helgason v. Hartford Ins. Co., 187 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
In Helgason, the court said: "Article 2315 predicates liability for damages upon a find-
ing of 'fault' on the part of another. In determining fault a common sense test is to be
applied: that is, how would a reasonable, prudent person have acted . . .if faced with
similar conditions and circumstances?" Id. at 143.
The law changed, however, in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249
So. 2d 133 (1971), wherein the court held that "fault" under article 2315 is not limited
to negligence, but that negligence is simply illustrative of fault. See notes 41-44, infra,
and accompanying text.
9. In Louisiana and many other jurisdictions, evidence of a latent brake defect is
simply evidence favorable to a defendant challenging a negligence allegation and in-
ferences of negligence. In effect, the defense is simply a denial of negligence, as
opposed to being a rebuttal to a presumption of negligence, or a legal excuse for ordi-
narily negligent conduct. See note 36, infra.
10. See note 5, supra, and accompanying text. Other cases following Hassell have
also recognized the defense. See, e.g., Robinson v. American Home Assurance Co., 183
So. 2d 77 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Dowden v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 153 So. 2d 162 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963).
NOTES
defect defense was actually upheld at the appellate court level in
Louisiana." In fact, the supreme court did not hear a successful la-
tent brake defect case until 1969.12 Since the defense was a jurispru-
dentially established doctrine," it was the province of the courts to
fix the standards required to invoke the defense successfully. As an-
nounced by the Orleans Circuit Court of Appeal in Hassell v. Collet-
ti,4 the first reported Louisiana latent brake defect case, "the proof
submitted by the alleged tortfeasor must be of a most convincing
nature."" This evidence "should be such to exclude any other
reasonable hypothesis in respect to the cause of the accident except
that it resulted solely from the alleged defect.""6 Obviously, this
standard imposes a rigid and onerous burden on the defendant
employing the defense-a burden so demanding that it could be
satisfied in very few instances.
The Louisiana courts were relu'ctant to make the defense more
readily available, "perhaps . ..[out of] a fear that such a defense
would be abused." 7 As a consequence of the court's hesitancy, only
four Louisiana cases at the appellate court level" can be found in
which the defense was sustained. A brief analysis of these cases
reveals certain factors that distinguish them from the many other
cases in which the latent brake defect defense failed. 9
In Delahoussaye v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 0 the first of the cases in which the defense was successful, a
fact which is recurrent through all the successful cases manifests
11. Delahoussaye v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1967).
12. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330, 223 So. 2d 822 (1969).
13. See Mallett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 240 So. 2d 413, 416 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970) (Fruge, J., concurring) (wherein Judge Fruge stated that the court should
not ignore innocent victims any longer by "supporting this jurisprudentially created
rule further"); Towner v. Milligan, 234 So. 2d 500, 504 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970) (Tate, J.,
dissenting) (wherein then Judge Tate referred to "the jurisprudential rule [being]
developed in an unbroken line of decisions").
14. 12 So. 2d 31 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943).
15. Id at 32.
16. Id. Nearly all Louisiana latent brake defect cases quote or paraphrase this
fundamental statement. See, e.g., Trascher v. Eagle Indem. Co., 48 So. 2d 695 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1950).
17. Delahoussaye v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d 287, 289 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967).
18. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330, 223 So. 2d 822 (1969); Mallett v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 240 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Towner v.
Milligan, 234 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Delahoussaye v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
19. For a detailed summary of the requirements needed to invoke a successful
latent brake defect defense, see Ryan v. Rawls, 260 So. 2d 137 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
20. 202 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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itself-the defect resulted in a fluid leak which left a visible trail on
the road leading to the accident.21 This fact is notable in that it
proved that a defect truly did exist;22 the defendant did not depend
solely on his unsupported testimony of brake failure (e.g., "my pedal
went to the floor"). As stated in an unsuccessful latent brake defect
case, "[i]n addition to his own statement, the driver should by testi-
mony of a mechanic or other competent evidence prove that the
defect in the brakes really existed .. ". ."" The four successful cases
support the conclusion that it is imperative that the defendant have
"other competent evidence,"" in addition to his own testimony, to
carry the defense. The fluid trail fulfills this requirement.
Also common to the successful cases is the existence of proof of
the following: the defect was concealed such that a proper inspection
would not have revealed it, and such an inspection had been con-
ducted within a reasonable time prior to the accident.2" All four
cases include a finding that the brakes had been properly inspected,"
with the resultant conclusion that the defect was indeed concealed.27
Additionally, there exists throughout the cases a recognized princi-
ple requiring the attempted use of an emergency brake if reasonable
21. It is the sudden loss of fluid that causes the brakes to fail. Defective hoses
(fluid lines) caused the leak in all the cases except Mallett, in which a brake cylinder
leaked. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. at 334, 223 So. 2d at 823; Mallett v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 240 So. 2d at 415; Towner v. Milligan, 234 So. 2d at
501; Delahoussaye v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d at 289.
22. Whether the defect is justified as being latent is to be determined from other
facts. See notes 25-29, infra, and accompanying text.
23. Dowden v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 153 So. 2d 162, 164 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) (em-
phasis added). In Dowden, the defendant claimed his brakes failed to hold, but no
other facts supporting his contention were raised.
24. I& at 164. See also W. MALONE & L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORT LAW
652-56 (1970).
25. The terms "proper inspection" or "reasonable inspection" are found in vir-
tually all of the Louisiana latent brake defect cases. See, e.g., Dowden v. Jefferson Ins.
Co., 153 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963). In Towner v. Milligan, 234 So. 2d 500 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1970), the court said that a driver must take reasonable care in having
brakes inspected. In Towner, an inspection three months prior to the accident was con-
sidered to be within a reasonable time. Id. at 502.
26. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. at 334, 223 So. 2d at 823; Mallett v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 240 So. 2d at 415; Towner v. Milligan, 234 So. 2d at
502; Delahoussaye v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d at 289.
27. Judge (later Justice) Tate dissented in Toumer v. Milligan, 234 So. 2d 500, 504
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), claiming that the jurisprudential requirements of the defense
were not met. Certainly, of these cases, Towner's showing of facts in favor of the
defense is the weakest: the brake inspection said to be reasonable prior to the accident
was a cursory inspection given for a Louisiana inspection sticker, and the rotted fluid
line may well have been found with proper inspection. Judge Tate also argued that the
defendant failed to carry the emergency brake requirement of the defense. See note
28, infra, and accompanying text.
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time existed in which to apply one. The unreasonable failure to ap-
ply the brake, or an emergency brake failure due to a negligently
maintained system, constitutes negligence as a matter of law in
Louisiana and was fatal to a latent brake defect defense.28 The emer-
gency brake requirement was met in all four successful cases.'
Despite the fact that the defense had seldom been raised suc-
cessfully, a call was made to abandon it in Louisiana. Judge Tate
was the first to voice opposition to the use of the defense." He
espoused his theory in an "especially concurring"'" opinion in Cart-
wright v. Firemen's Insurance Co. 2 -the opinion was "for the bene-
fit of the higher reviewing court,"3 and it was largely due to this
opinion that the supreme court eventually reviewed the case. 4
Judge Tate argued that Revised Statutes 32:341 (the safe brakes
statute),35 requiring the proper maintenance of brakes on cars, pro-
vided a basis for strict liability in brake failure cases. 6 He claimed
28. See Robinson v. American Home Assurance Co., 183 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966). In Robinson, the court stated "the failure of a motorist to use the emergency
brake on the automobile ...after he realizes that the first brake is not holding and
while he still has an opportunity to control the vehicle by using the emergency brake,
constitutes negligence." Id. at 79.
29. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. at 340-41, 223 So. 2d at 826; Mallett
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 240 So. 2d at 415; Towner v. Milligan, 234 So. 2d at
503; Delahoussaye v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d at 289.
30. See Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1968) (Tate, J., concurring), affl'd, 254 La. 330, 223 So. 2d 822 (1969).
31. Id. Judge Tate wrote the majority opinion applying traditional latent brake
defect standards. Being opposed to the doctrine, however, he added an "especially con-
curring" opinion in which he offered strict liability as an alternative to the latent
brake doctrine, which he considered unfair. Id.
32. 213 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (Tate, J., concurring), aff'd, 254 La.
330, 223 So. 2d 822 (1969).
33. Id.
34. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330, 223 So. 2d 822 (1969). The court
stated that Judge Tate's "observations tended to create uncertainty in this area ...
and that a definitive expression by the court would serve to resolve the unsettling
effect." Id. at 335-36, 223 So. 2d at 824.
35. LA. R.S. 32:341 (1950) provides in pertinent part: "[E]very motor vehicle, other
than a motorcycle .. .when operated on a highway of this state, shall be equipped
with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, in-
cluding two separate means of applying the brakes ...." This statute's provisions are
very similar to safe brakes statutes in most states. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
169.67 (1959); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 347.35(1) (1965).
36. 213 So. 2d at 156 (Tate, J., concurring). According to Judge Tate, the applica-
tion of Revised Statutes 32:341 may "require a stricter degree of liability on the part
of an owner of such an abnormally dangerous thing as a powerful motor vehicle with
brakes that fail." Id. He wrote further: "[An owner is presumed as a matter of law to
know of his defective brakes, because of his statutory duty not to operate a vehicle
without proper brakes . I..." d  at 157. Another rationale was also offered: "[Olne who
engages in abnormally dangerous activities ...is held to strict liability for damages
1980]
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that the provisions of the statute are mandatory and do not allow
for an excused violation;37 thus, any violation of the statute,
regardless of negligence fault, imposes liability on the defendant.
Instead of adopting Judge Tate's proposal, the supreme court
issued what it called a "definitive expression by the court,"38 reject-
ing the theory and reaffirming the notion that "there can be no
recovery without fault except in those instances where strict lia-
bility is provided by legislative action."39 The court evidently felt
thereby occasioned." Id. (Citations omitted.) For a similar view, wherein Judge Fruge
follows Judge Tate's reasoning closely, see Mallett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
240 So. 2d at 416 (Fruge, J., concurring).
Though strict liability concerning brake defect cases has been considered in other
jurisdictions, the vast majority of states do not have strict liability in this area. Pres-
ently only two states apply strict liability to break defect cases-Connecticut and
Ohio. See Smith v. Finkel, 130 Conn. 354, 34 A.2d 209 (1943); Spalding v. Waxier, 2 Oh.
St. 2d 1, 205 N.E.2d 890 (1965). The general rule is that safe brakes statutes and the
latent brake defect defense coexist peacefully. The standard of care created by the
safe brakes statutes of other states is adopted, in many cases, to establish a vehicle
operator's duty. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 190.
A violation of the safe brakes statute in these jurisdictions will produce one of
three results. In some jurisdictions, violation of the statute raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence. However, violation might be justified. One justification is con-
cealed (latent) defects which could not reasonably be found and corrected. See, e.g.,
Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 513 (1968); Eddy v.
McAninach, 141 Colo. 223, 347 P.2d 499 (1959); Smith v. Glesing, 248 N.E.2d 366 (Ind.
App. 1969). A successful rebuttal may be found in Bartlett v. Bryant, 166 Colo. 113,
442 P.2d 425 (1968). Some jurisdictions hold that a violation of the statute constitutes
negligence, but a legal excuse may absolve the defendant. See, e.g., Dubuque Area
Chamber of Commerce v. Adams, 225 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1973) (defendant successfully
offered a latent brake defect as a legal excuse for the violation); Peters v. Reick, 257
Iowa 12, 131 N.W.2d 529 (1964) (showing of due care alone will not absolve defendant,
but he may be exculpated if he can show that it was impossible to have discovered
that the brakes would fail). Finally, a large number of jurisdictions hold that a viola-
tion of the statute is simply one fact to be considered in a determination of negligence.
In these jurisdictions, a violation is merely a fact raising a possible inference of
negligence. See, e.g., Yarnell Ice Cream Co. v. Williamson, 244 Ark. 893, 428 S.W.2d 86
(1968); Mintzer v. Miller, 249 Md. 506, 240 A.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1968). For a successful
latent defect defense, see, e.g., Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220, 255 A.2d 387 (Ct. App.
1969). Louisiana, prior to the instant case, was a member of the class of jurisdictions
that considered a violation a fact raising an inference. The inference could be coun-
tered by a latent brake defect defense, which would relieve the defendant of possible
liability. See generally Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. at 335-36, 223 So. 2d
at 824.
37. Judge Tate focused on the word "shall" in the statute and concluded that the
use of "shall" creates a "statutory duty" that "does not, applied literally at least, admit
of an avoidance by attempted but unsuccessful compliance." 213 So. 2d at 156. See note
35, supra.
38. 254 La. at 336, 223 So. 2d at 824. See note 34, supra.
39. 254 La. at 337, 223 So. 2d at 824.
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that the safe brakes statute was not intended to establish strict lia-
bility."0
The supreme court's position concerning no liability without
fault (i.e., negligence) under article 2315 changed in Langlois v.
Allied Chemical Corp."1 The court determined that article 2315 fault
is not restricted to negligence fault, but rather that negligence is
merely illustrative of fault under the Civil Code.'2 Justice Barham,
in a concurring opinion in Simon v. Ford Motor Co.,'" claimed that
the language in Cartwright asserting that there could be no liability
without negligence fault under article 2317 was overruled by Lang-
lois." Justice Barham, like Judge Tate in Cartwright, took the posi-
tion that strict liability should apply in automobile defect cases.
The trend toward the expansion of the traditional meaning of
fault in some areas' culminated in the case of Loescher v. Parr,"6 in
which the court, interpreting article 2317, held that a custodian or
owner of a thing which creates an unreasonable risk of injury is
liable for those injuries caused by it (the defective thing).'7 The
amount of care taken by the custodian is not relevant in this inquiry -
the custodian is liable because of his legal relationship to the thing;'"
40. The court stated that "it would require much more positive and specific legis-
lative expression than is contained in the Highway Regulatory Act" to make the court
abandon the prerequisite of fault for liability. Id. at 339, 223 So. 2d at 825.
41. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
42. "Article 2316 is not all-inclusive or definitive of fault, but rather illustrative of
fault." Id. at 1078, 249 So. 2d at 136. The court found an alternate source for fault in
the standard of conduct mandated by article 669, concerning a landowner's duties in
relation to his neighboring landowners. By violating the provision of article 669, the
landowner is at fault for damages caused by his violation, without regard to any negli-
gence on his part.
43. 282 So. 2d 126, 163 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 136. "That case [Langlois] overruled Cartwright . . . insofar as it held
that . . . article 2317 required negligence under the court's interpretation ... of fault
in . . . article 2315." Id.
45. Dupre v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), was
the first step toward a new interpretation of article 2317. In Dupre, the injury caused
by a thing created a refutable presumption of negligence on the part of the custodian.
In Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974), the court held that under article 2321,
the owner of an animal was liable for damages caused by the animal regardless of the
owner's standard of care-negligence need not be shown. In Turner v. Bucher, 308 So.
2d 270 (La. 1975), the court found the parent of a minor child liable under article 2318
for the acts of the child that were deemed wrongful, again with no regard to the
parents' standard of care. Negligence fault was not required. These latter two deci-
sions opened the way for the Loescher court's interpretation of article 2317.
46. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
47. For an excellent treatment of Loescher and its effect on Louisiana tort law,
see Note, supra note 4.
48. 324 So. 2d at 446.
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negligence is not at issue in determining this "legal fault."4 Once
the essential determination that the thing is defective has been
made, only by proving that victim fault, third-party fault, or an ir-
resistible force caused the harm can the defendant escape liability.5"
Loescher specifically overruled the Cartwright language dealing
with negligence as an essential for article 2317 fault. With the ad-
vent of Loescher and its explicit partial overruling of Cartwright,
the latent brake defect doctrine was rendered extremely vulnerable.
In Arceneaux, the court was faced with a situation in which it
found as a fact that a genuine brake defect did not exist. 2 Thus, it
was not essential for the court to deal with the status of the latent
brake defect doctrine at all; the court need not have gone any fur-
ther than its conclusion that the court of appeal applied an incorrect
standard of review, and that the jury finding of a latent brake
defect was clearly wrong.
The court, however, did not limit its analysis to the appellate
review question. "[T]o prevent a repetition of errors in other appeals
of jury cases,"54 the court went on to discuss how latent brake defect
cases should subsequently be treated in Louisiana. The court first
analogized the rear-end collision in Arceneaux to the head-on colli-
sion occurring when one driver leaves his own lane and strikes an
oncoming car, which was the situation presented in Simon v. Ford
Motor Co.55 In Simon, the court held that there is a presumption of
negligence on the part of an errant driver who left his lane of traffic
and struck another motorist, who was without fault, and that the
defendant must rebut the presumption with evidence proving him
free of "any dereliction however slight."8 The Arceneaux court
stated that this burden shift applies in "exceptional cases when a
plaintiff-motorist is without fault."57 The court then appeared to
change its emphasis, saying "it might also be said ... that it seems
49. Id. at 447. This "legal fault" is really fault without negligence. The court
states that it has "sometimes been referred to as strict liability." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 448.
52. In Arceneaux, there was no evidence of a fluid loss or expert testimony indi-
cating any specific defect. The defendant's testimony stated that the pedal, without
forewarning, went to the floor. 365 So. 2d at 1332. This uncorroborated testimony
could not carry the heavy burden placed on the defendant, as the history of the
defense indicates. See notes 19-24, supra, and accompanying text.
53. 365 So. 2d at 1333. See note 2, supra.
54. 365 So. 2d at 1334.
55. 282 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
56. Id. at 133 (emphasis in original). Simon followed the rationale of Rizley v.
Cutrer, 232 La. 655, 95 So. 2d 139 (1957).
57. 365 So. 2d at 1335.
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only reasonable that a motorist should not run into an automobile
ahead of him, when the driver of that automobile is without fault."68
The court then chose to digress from Simon and turn to the
standards established by Civil Code article 2317."' Finding that the
defendants were the custodians of the automobile, the court stated
that the requirements of article 2317 are met when the plaintiff
proves "that his damages were caused when he was struck from the
rear by defendants' automobile."' At that point, the defendant
owner is found not liable, only because the damage was caused by
the non-owner driver's negligence and not because of a brake fail-
ure.
6 1
With this utilization of article 2317 in Arceneaux, the court ef-
fectively applies strict liability to brake defect cases in Louisiana. 2
Had the court not gone beyond the application of the Simon pre-
sumption to the case, strict liability would not have been effectu-
ated. There would have been a presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendants which they would have had the burden of
rebutting. Given the facts of Arceneaux, the defendant would not
have been able successfully to overcome the presumption of negli-
gence by invoking the latent brake defect defense." Thus, the status
of the defense in Louisiana would not have been significantly
changed had the court limited its decision to the presumption. 4
The application of article 2317 to latent brake defects deals a
death blow to the use of the doctrine as a defense to a negligence
allegation, since a defendant's standard of care is no longer relevant.
Moreover, there is language in the opinion that arguably expands
58. Id. (Emphasis added.)
59. The court stated that "[ilt is more appropriate, however, to resort to the stan-
dards established in the Civil Code." Id.
60. lId
61. Id at 1335-36. The court concludes that the owner "therefore has sustained his
burden of proving that the harm was caused by the fault of a third person." Id. at
1336. One may question the need to discuss third-party fault, as the court found that
no defect existed. See text at note 50, supra.
62. This is achieved by eliminating the requirement of negligence fault from the
latent brake defect cases. The court in Arceneaux stated: "[R]esponsibility did not
necessarily depend upon negligent acts, but upon fault ...." 365 So. 2d at 1335.
63. See note 52, supra. The facts of the Arceneaux case did not support a latent
brake defect defense. The court stated that if the jury's verdict was predicated "on the
existence of a latent defect [it] was clearly wrong." 365 So. 2d at 1333.
64. See text at note 7, supra. The latent brake defect defense, if supported by the
necessary evidence, would still have been recognized as a defense had the court not
applied article 2317 to latent brake defects. It would be used to rebut the presumption
of negligence.
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the application of article 2317 beyond Loescher 5 It is submitted,
however, that Arceneaux is merely an extension of the Loescher
principle into the field of automobile brake defect cases, and not a
broadening of the Loescher principle itself. Because of an inaccurate
restatement of the Loescher principle by Justice Dixon, one could
interpret Arceneaux as abandoning the requirement of a defect in
the thing which caused the injury. Although the finding of a defect
was essential in Loescher,6 the Arceneaux court stated that the
plaintiff satisfied the requirements of article 2317 by "proving that
his damages were caused when he was struck from the rear by
defendants' automobile. Defendants were the custodians of the auto-
mobile, and were therefore responsible for the damages it caused." 7
This is an incorrect restatement of the Loescher rule-Justice
Dixon's formulation does not require proof of an unreasonable risk
of injury created by the thing, ie., a defect. A plaintiff could, under
Justice Dixon's reframing of the Loescher principle, invoke article
2317 in all car accidents, whether caused by vehicle defect or negli-
gent operation of the vehicle. 8
Justice Dennis addressed this misstatement of Loescher, in his
concurring opinion, and disagreed with the "verbiage" 9 used by
Justice Dixon. Justice Dennis recognized the requirement of a defect
to employ article 2317, and refused to depart from the principles set
down in Loescher.7 0 It is likely, however, that the inaccuracies of the
rephrasing of the Loescher rule in Arceneaux were inadvertent mis-
statements, and not an effort to broaden or change article 2317 law
as interpreted by Loescher.7'
65. See notes 66-71, infra, and accompanying text. Justice Dixon also misstates
the language in Loescher which stated that custodians are responsible for the damage
caused by things "creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others." Loescher v. Parr,
324 So. 2d at 446 (emphasis added). Justice Dixon states that custodians are responsi-
ble for "an instrumentality which causes an unreasonable risk of injury." ,365 So. 2d at
1335 (emphasis added).
66. For example, the court in Loescher stated that the "owner-guardian of the defec-
tive tree is therefore liable for his legal fault in maintaining the defective tree ...." 324
So. 2d 441 at 449 (emphasis added).
67. 365 So. 2d at 1335 (emphasis added).
68. Without the requirement of defect under article 2317, the theory could be
used against defendants who were simply negligent in conduct. This would result in a
shifting of the traditional burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant.
69. 365 So. 2d at 1337 (Dennis, J., concurring in part).
70. "Loescher limited the concept of 'things' which would form the basis of Article
2317 strict liability to defective things which 'create an unreasonable risk of harm to
others."' Id. Justice Dennis stated that "[ilnsofar as the language of the Court's opinion
seems to depart from these principles, I disagree . . . ." Id.
71. The abandonment of the defect requirement under Loescher would be a
drastic change in the law. It is submitted that so drastic a change would certainly have
been accompanied by explicit language stating that the requirement was being aban-
doned and why the change was made.
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A simple illustration demonstrates how the latent brake defect
doctrine has been effectively eradicated by the Arceneaux decision:
The plaintiff, A, is rear-ended by the defendant, B, who is custodian
of his automobile. A sues B, alleging negligent operation of the vehi-
cle, and proves that B struck him from the rear. Under the Simon
presumption, which the plaintiff could attempt to invoke,"2 the defen-
dant would have to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of
negligence. If the defendant attempts to rebut this charge by con-
tending that a latent brake defect was the cause of the accident, the
defendant has inadvertently invoked article 2317. By admitting that
a defective thing in his custody caused the injury to A, the re-
quirements of Loescher/Arceneaux are met. The defendant has locked
himself into liability, absent a showing of victim fault, third-party
fault, or an irresistible force."
The only logical defense in a genuine brake defect case will be
that of third-party fault. This defense may be pivotal, as many cases
can exist in which a mechanic is at fault for negligent maintenance
work. In California, however, the duty of maintaining sufficient
brakes is non-delegable." A non-delegability theory could con-
ceivably be applied in Louisiana to article 2317 defect cases if the
courts feel that social justice calls for the custodians to be liable in
spite of third-party fault."5 However, in Tardo v. New Orleans Public
Service, Inc.," a case in which a drainage gutter contractor
negligently installed gutters on defendants' house, the court followed
the Loescher holding and found that the contractor's third-party
fault exculpated the defendant custodian under article 2317." Con-
72. It is not entirely clear if Arceneaux holds that the Simon presumption will be
in effect in cases of rear-end collision. See text at notes 54-58, supra. Still, the plaintiff
would be wise to seek to invoke the presumption, as it shifts the burden of proof to
the defendant.
73. See text at note 50, supra.
74. See Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 513 (1968).
The court in Maloney rejected strict liability in brake defect cases, but ruled that if
negligence causes the defect, even if a third party's, the owner is liable because his
duty cannot be delegated.
75. l& The court in Maloney stated that non-delegability operates "to assure that
when a negligently caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated by the
person whose activity caused the harm and who may therefore properly be held liable
for the negligence of his agent." Id. In Tardo v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 353
So. 2d 409 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), the court stated that there
may be an inherent contradiction between holding an owner liable for maintaining
a defective thing and exonerating him from liability where he can prove that the
fault was caused by a third person because the imposition of liability without fault
would seem to make irrelevant the fault of a third person.
Id. at 414.
76. 353 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
77. But see Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 513 (1968).
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versely, in Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.,"8 it was held that the duty to keep
a building in repair under article 2322 T" is non-delegable. An applica-
tion of non-delegability to article 2317 law would result, practically,
not only in liability without fault, but absolute liability as well inas-
much as the fault imposing liability would be purely legal fault.
One may question the wisdom of applying article 2317 strict lia-
bility to latent brake defect situations. It could be argued that the
defense did not exculpate defendants to the degree demanded by
"the exigencies of social justice,"8 ° which require that losses be
shifted from innocent plaintiffs to defendants by "creating liability
where there has been no fault.""1 "Exigencies of social justice""2
typically justify the application of strict liability; but with only four
instances in Louisiana jurisprudence of the successful use of the la-
tent brake defect defense, and the difficult burden a defendant has
in proving the defense,8 one may wonder if social justice really re-
quires that strict liability be applied to brake defect cases. However,
it could also be argued that the application of strict liability in
Arceneaux makes for good law, as operators of automobiles possess
the knowledge that defects may exist in their cars, and that, as be-
tween an innocent victim injured by the defect and the operator
whose automobile caused the accident, the car operator should pay."
The application of article 2317 to cases of genuine latent brake
defect is a logical extension of the Loescher rule. 5 Although it is a
78. 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978). In Olsen an explosion on an oil rig (considered to be
a building) injured the plaintiffs. The defendants claimed it was the fault of a third
party that caused the explosion and sought to escape liability. See Note, Olsen v. Shell
Oik Expanded Liability for Offshore Oil Platform Owners, 40 LA. L. REv. 233 (1979).
79. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2322 provides in pertinent part: "The owner of a building is
answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to
repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original construction." Fault is based
on the owner's failure to maintain his building so as to avoid the creation of unneces-
sary risk to others. In Olsen, the court noted that
Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting Article 2322 has held that the owner of a
building has a nondelegable duty to keep his buildings ... in repair so as to avoid
unreasonable risk of injury to others, and that he is held strictly liable for injuries
to others resulting from his failure to perform this duty imposed by law ....
365 So. 2d at 1292.
80. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 494.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See text at notes 10-29, supra.
84. One commentator has opined that "[iut is an aberration of the entire thrust of
tort law in automobile cases to force the innocent party to bear the loss for the non-
functioning of the defendant's brakes." The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1970-1971 Term-Torts, 32 LA. L. REv. 213, 216 (1972).
85. For a 1977 prediction that article 2317-Loescher law would spread to latent
brake defect cases, see Note, supra note 4, at 241 n.50.
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dramatic technical change in the law, the application will not cause
any unsettling effects in practice, as the defense had seldom been
successfully invoked in Louisiana. However, if later jurisprudence
adheres to Justice Dixon's misstatements of the Loescher rule as
the present state of the law, great practical changes will have oc-
curred as a result of Arceneaux: the traditional plaintiff's burden of
proof will have been shifted to the defendant in automobile rear-end
collision cases, and the concept of defect will have ceased to be a
vital element of a plaintiff's case under Civil Code article 2317.
W. H. Parker, III
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION: CAN AN ATTORNEY RELY ON
WHAT THE GOVERNMENT TELLS HIM?
The attorney representing a school lunchroom worker injured
by an allegedly defective steam cooker wrote the school board and
requested the name of the manufacturer of the equipment. The
school board furnished him an incorrect name, information which he
used in filing suit. After the one-year prescriptive period had run,
the attorney discovered the mistake and amended the plaintiff's
petition to sue the school board for its negligence in advising him.
The trial court sustained an exception of no cause of action, and the
court of appeal affirmed.' In affirming the lower court's decision, the
Louisiana Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had failed to allege
facts which would justify the imposition upon the school board of a
duty to exercise care in supplying the information.! Devore v.
Hobart Manufacturing Co., 367 So. 2d 836 (La. 1979).
Courts in common law jurisdictions have established a general
framework of facts necessary for a finding of negligent misrepresen-
1. 359 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
2. The majority cited as reasons for its holding the insufficiency of the defen-
dant's knowledge of the extent to which the plaintiff and her attorney planned to rely
on the information and the fact that neither was prevented from personally inspecting
the equipment. The opinion implicitly adopted the conclusions of the appellate court,
which relied heavily upon section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, defining
the common law cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. The part of the
Restatement test not met was the requirement that the defendant have a pecuniary in-
terest in the transfer of the information. The majority's implicit approval of the in-
termediate court's holding and the dissent's protest of the use of the pecuniary in-
terest test requirement indicate that this segment of the Restatement test was a ma-
jor bar to the finding of a cause of action.
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